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I-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal because this is an appeal from afinaljudgment.

Judgment was rendered in the trial court in favor of appellee and against appellants following the
granting of appellee's motion for summary judgment.

n.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES.
Whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant appellants relief

from default with respect to their failure to serve and file timely opposition to the summary
judgment motion. Appellants contend that the trial court abused its discretion because appellants
timely filed their request for relieffromdefault and the trail court failed to act on the request for
relief. Appellant Steven Fox claimed under oath that he had never received any of the moving
papers on the motion for summary judgment. Appellant Jason Fojc stated under oath in his filing
I
with the trial court that the moving papers on the motion were misplaced, and as a result, he was
unable to serve and file timely substantive opposition to the motion. Appellants claim that they
have substantive defenses to the claims asserted by appellee in its complaint and that triable

I

issues of material fact exist such that summary judgment should i>c denied. Appellants claim
that they have been denied procedural due process by virtue of the trial court's refusal to
consider their request for leave to submit substantive opposition to the summary judgment
motion because they did not receive due notice of the proceedings referenced in the summary
judgment motion. Alternatively, appellants claim that the trial court committed an error of law
by denying appellants procedural due process based upon their request for leave to be able to
serve and file substantive opposition to the summary judgment ^notion.
HI.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
4

Appellee filed a complaint against appellants for recovery onl what the appellee claims to
be an obligation arising on a promissory note. In addition to naming appellants as defendants,
appellee named Marilyn J. Fox, the mother of appellant Jason Fox and the former spouse of
appellant Steven Fox, as an additional defendant. However, this action is stayed as to defendant
Marilyn J. Fox because of her filing of a voluntary petition for relief* under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which bankruptcy case is pending in the United States Bankruptcy Court,
Central District of California. This court is already aware of the bankruptcy filing, because the
matter was addressed by this court in an order to show cause as to whether or not the entire
action should be stayed pending the resolution of the Marilyn Fox bankruptcy case.
Following the service of the complaint, appellants duly filed their answer to the
complaint. Appellee then commenced written discovery. Appellaijits duly served their responses
I
to the written discovery. Appellee thereupon filed a motion for sinnmary judgment. Appellant
Steven Fox claims that he was never served with the moving papers on the summary judgment
motion. Appellant Jason Fox claims that the summary judgment papers were misplaced. When
appellants discovered the pendency of the summary judgment proceedings, they filed with the
trial court declarations in which they claimed that they had not been able to serve and file
substantive opposition to the summary judgment motion for the ijeasons stated herein.
Appellants' declarations in opposition to the summary judgment motion were served and filed
when appellee requested that the summary judgment motion was ready for decision because
appellants had failed to timely serve and file substantive opposition to the motion.
I
The trial court never conducted a hearing on the request (of appellants for leave to serve
i
I

and file substantive opposition, and the court never directly rulqd on the declarations submitted
by the appellants to the effect that they had not received notice pf the summary judgment

proceedings. Instead, the trial court simply entered summary judgment in favor of appellee, and
this appeal follows.

IV.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The complaint alleges that appellants are liable to plaintiff dn a promissory note.

Appellants contend that there was no debtor/creditor relationship between appellants and
appellee and that the relationship, base upon the underlying documents executed by the parties,
amounted to a partnership or joint venture for the development of 4 parcel of real property locate
in Idaho. The documentation, prepared by appellee, suggests that a loan was made by appellee
to an entity known as Sunrise Oaks Capital Fund, LLC, a Utah limited liability company, which
l

is not a party to this case. The underlying documents show that the Sunrise entity was the
principal obligor on any loan, and if the documents are to be constfrued as loan agreements, the
appellants were only secondarily liable as guarantors.
Appellants have learnedfromdiscovery undertaken in thelFox bankruptcy case that a
secret agreement existed between Collier and Sunrise such that Collier will not look to Sunrise
for repayment of the loan. The loan documentation does not call for the waiver of any surety
defenses on the part of appellants. Furthermore, appellants have learned through deposition
discovery in the Fox bankruptcy case that apparently plaintiff and appellee now owns and
controls the Idaho property, and has refused to credit to the loan amount the fair market value of
that property. Appellants claim that, even if the documents are construed and found to be a debt
instrument obligating appellants on the loan made for the acquisition of the property by appellee
in their capacities as alleged guarantors, they are none the less entitled to a credit against any
such liability for the fair market value of the Idaho property.
6

Finally, appellants urge that even if the transaction is construed as a loan, they are not
liable to appellee on any debt instrument unless and until appellee exhausts its remedies for
collection of the loan against the principal obligor, Sunrise.
Discovery in the Fox bankruptcy case has also uncovered the fact that the principals of
appellee Collier and Sunrise are the same and that they maintain the same offices.
If the trial court were to deny the appellants' defense under suretyship law that appellee
must proceed first against the principal obligor, Sunrise, appellants are still entitled to
contribution over against Sunrise for whatever may be the obligation of appellants to appellee
Collier because of Sunrise's liability as principal obligor on the underlying loan.
Simply put, appellants never had the opportunity to raise any of the above facts by way of
opposition to the summary judgment motion. At the very least, as a result of the summary
judgment, appellee Collier has been unjustly enriched because it now has a judgment against
appellants Fox and controls the Idaho property as to which the loan documents provided that
appellants were to be granted an option to acquire the entire interest in the Idaho property,
without any participation by Collier or Sunrise.
The defenses that appellants raise here on this appeal for burposes of demonstrating how
i

they would have been able to provide substantive defense to the summary judgment motion, are

I

defenses that debtor Marilyn Fox now asserts against Collier and Sunrise in her bankruptcy case.
Debtor Marilyn Fox stands in the same position as appellants Jason Fox and Steven Fox with
respect to the underlying investment documents. That is, appellee claims that debtor Marilyn
Fox was a co-guarantor of the underlying loan that appellee Collier made to Sunrise. In the
bankruptcy case, debtor claims that there was no debtor-creditor relationship between the parties,
I
and that the underlying documents should be construed as a joiidt venture or partnership between

and among appellee, Sunrise, appellants and debtor Marilyn Fox, sucth that no claim can be
asserted by appellee against any alleged guarantor unless and until there is a dissolution, winding
up and accounting of the business and financial affairs of the joint venture or partnership. At the
least, the value of the Idaho property has to be ascertained and appellants given appropriate
credit against any indebtedness found due and owing on the guarantee.

V,

ARGUMENT.
This is a simple case where appellants have been denied procedural due process. Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b) provides that, upon motion and on upon such terms as are
just, the court may, upon furtherance of justice, relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order or proceeding based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable

I

neglect; newly discovered evidence;fraud,whether intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation or
misconduct of an adverse party; the judgment is void; or any othejr reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment
Here, appellants presented such an application in the fornji of their sworn declarations
while the summary judgment proceedings were pending. The trial court denied appellants
procedural due process by refusing to rule on their application for relief and refusing, without
comment, to grant appellants any relief so as to enable them to sjubmit substantive opposition to
the summary judgment motion.

VI.

CONCLUSION.
For the forgoing reasons, the judgment should be reversed with direction to the trial court

J
that appellants be given leave to serve and file substantive opposition to the summary judgment

motion, and that appellants have such other and further relief as is just and equitable in the
circumstances.

DATED: June 1,2010
aswiFox

JUk

DATED: June 1,2010

„
Steven iFox
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I am employed in Salt Lake City, Utah I am over the age of(eighteen (18); my
business address is as .set forth on the cover page of this brief.
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APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF on the interested parties in this action
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I caused such document to be sent via facsimile
transmission on this date during regular business
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2008(4), I caused the machine to print a transmission
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person
in charge of the recipients office.
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
St#te of Utah that the above is true and correjet

FEDERAL

I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this
covirt at whose direction the service was made.

(!) EXECUTED on June 1,2010, at Salt Lake City, California.
JASON FQ2L
Type or Print Naitte
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
1

COLLIER MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC.,

|
^)RDER OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil No. 080926818

JASON FOX; MARILYN FOX; STEVE
FOX; CHRIS WRIGHT; and NOBLE
HOUSE SERIES C, LLC,
Defendants.

Judjjje Kate Toomey

i

1

Based upon Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, and
Defendants, Jason Fox and Steve Fox's, failure to respond to Plaintiffs Motion, the Court having
reviewed the pleadings and papers in file herein, and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is grantee^

2.

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against Defendants Jason Fox and Steve Fox as

follows:
(a)

The principal amount of $750,000.00;

(b)

Accrued interest at the rate of two and one-hajf percent (2.5%) per month

from December 29, 2007 through June 29, 2008 in the amount of $14,314.52

(c)

Accrued interest at the rate of twenty percent (24%) per annumfromJune 30,

2008 through the date the Note is paid in full;
(d)
3.

Late fees pursuant to the Note in the amouht of $75,000.00;

Pursuant to the Promissory Note executed by Defendants Jason Fox and Steve Fox,

Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against these Defendants for itsj court costs and attorney's fees
in connection with this action in the amount of $4,070.00.
4.

Post judgment interest shall accrue on the en|tire judgment amount at the

Promissory Note rate of twenty four percent (24%) per annum.
5.

This judgment shall be augmented in the amount o treasonable costs and attorney's

fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or other jvise as shall be established by
affidavit.
DATED this

V

day of ^ngust, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE KAT^ TOOMEY
District Court Judge
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